Life is not a race but a living. What we are experiencing right now is just a part of the totality of the world’s history unveiling before us. And the reason why we continue living in this world is to seek justice. A philosopher defines justice as a virtue of actions toward other people, and it is the whole of the virtue, not just part of it.
The ways in which people associate with others constitute particular justice. It is seen in distribution and in rectification.
Distributed justice involves geometrical proportion. If the unjust is unequal, then the just is equal. What is equal is the mean; therefore, justice is a mean and it always involves at least four terms: 2 people with 2 shares. Shares are equal in the same ratio as the persons are equal. If unequals recieve equal shares, or equals recieve unequal shares, it causes “quarrels and complaints .”
Now in the Philippines, the Impeachment Trial of Chief Justice Renato Corona continues to unfold before us, the purpose of which is mainly not to convict violators of the Constitution and the public trust, but instead to seek the ever-eluding Justice. The appointment of Chief Justice Renato Corona when the former Chief Justice of the Supreme Court Reynato Puno was about to retire on May 17, 2010, came as a surprise to many. The constitution specifically prohibits the President from appointing officials two months immediately before the next presidential election up to the end of his/her term . A suit was filed before the court questioning the appointment where the Supreme Court stated that the ban on appointments does not cover the judiciary. The court ruled with finality on April 20, 2010, with nine justices concurring, one dissenting, three inhibiting and two dismissing the case for being premature. This caused the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), the body that recommends nominees for appointments to the judiciary, to resume its sessions in determining the list to be submitted.
Renato C. Corona was appointed Chief Justice of the Supreme Court on May 12, 2010 by former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo based on the list submitted to her by the JBC. In a statement, the executive said that among the nominees submitted by the JBC, Corona was the “most senior Supreme Court justice”. When President Benigno Aquino III assumed office in June 30, 2010, the appointment of the Chief Justice became as vital issue, believing that the Corona, influencing other Associate Justices of the Supreme Court, would impose bias against his administration.
Some speculate that this impeachment complaint is merely a battle between the President and the Chief justice because of the Court’s decision to distribute the parcel of lands in the Hacienda Luisita (owned by the Conjuangco family, where the President is a part of) to the tenant farmers who have been working there. The decision in favor of the farmers, according to some, triggered the President to have the Chief Justice removed by filing an impeachment complaint against him. The President even bashed the Chief Justice openly questioning his authority because of his appointment and impliedly called the latter as incompetent because of the “flip-flopping” decisions in some cases decided by the Court.
On the December 12, 2011 in the flag-raising ceremony at the Supreme Court, Corona already knew that there was “a secret plan to remove me from office by any means, fair or foul.” Corona said that he would not resign. Meanwhile on the same day, a caucus of Aquino’s allies in the House of Representative was called. In conclusion of the majority caucus, Niel Tupas, Jr. presented the impeachment complaint; after the presentation, some of the congressman asked for more questions, while the other majority members asked to sign the complaint. Tupas said that there were no instructions from the Palace to impeach Corona, but stated that he told the President of their proposed action and the President supported it. The House of Representatives then voted in session to support the complaint, and acquired 188 votes, surpassing the requirement of one-third (1/3) number of votes.
Toby Tiangco resigned from the majority and the chairmanship of the Committee on Metro Manila development after the impeachment was passed in the House of Representatives. Tiangco said that the complaint was approved without the members of Congress questioning or explaining it. Hermilando Mandanas, did not sign the complaint, was relieved of the chairmanship of the Committee on Ways and Means. Even the public started questioning whether the congressmen who signed to verify the Impeachment complaint, did read the entirety of the document.
Notwithstanding the oppositions, the impeachment trial commenced. The House of Representatives presented their Articles of Impeachment consisting of eight articles alleging that Chief Justice Renato Corona’s culpable violation of the Constitution and betrayal of public trust:
The first article asserted that the Chief Justice betrayed the public trust by partiality and subservience in cases involving the Arroyo administration from the time he was appointed as associate justice to the time of his ‘midnight appointment’ as Chief Justice.
The second article states that the Chief Justice betrayed the public trust and violated the Constitution by culpable actions, in failing to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth as required under the Constitution.
The third article pertains to betrayal of public trust and violation of the Constitution by culpable actions in failing to meet and observe the stringent standards under the Constitution that provides that “member of the judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence” in allowing the Supreme Court to act on mere letters filed by a counsel which caused the issuance of flip-flopping decisions in final and executory cases; in creating an excessive entanglement with Mrs. Arroyo through the appointment of his wife to office; and in discussing with litigants regarding cases pending before the Supreme Court.
The fourth article states that the Chief Justice also betrayed the public trust and violated the constitution by culpable actions in disregarding the principle of separation of powers by issuing a status quo ante order against the House of Representatives in the case concerning the impeachment of then Ombudsman Merceditas Navarro-Gutierrez.
The fifth article states that the Chief Justice also betrayed the public trust in wanton arbitrariness and partiality in consistently disregarding the principle of res judicata in the cases involving the 16 newly-created cities, and the promotion of Dinagat Island into a province.
The sixth article states that the Chief Justice also betrayed the public trust in arrogating unto himself, and to a committee he created, the authority and jurisdiction to improperly investigate a justice of the Supreme Court for the purpose of exculpating him. Such authority and jurisdiction is properly reposed by the constitution in the House of Representatives via impeachment.
The seventh article allege that the Chief Justice also betrayed the public trust by acting partially in granting a temporary restraining order (TRO) in favor of former president Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo and her husband Jose Miguel Arroyo in order to give them an opportunity to escape prosecution and to frustrate the ends of justice, and in distorting the Supreme Court decision on the effectivity of the TRO in view of a clear failure to comply with the conditions of the Supreme Court’s own TRO.
And the eighth article states that the Chief Justice violated the Constitution by his culpable acts and committed graft and corruption in failing and refusing to account for the Judiciary Development Fund and Special Allowance for the Judiciary collections.
These articles of impeachment brought the complaint against the Chief Justice to the Senate impeachment Court after the required votes were acquired in the House of Representatives. The Senate received the articles of impeachment on December 13, 2011. Representatives Niel Tupas, Jr. and Reynaldo Umali delivered the Articles of impeachment. In the road to convict the Chief Justice as we see or hear it in everyday hearings, we also get to grasp the true reason why this procedure is necessary, why this kind of process, attempting the history to change its totality, is important, and why this process of seeking justice becomes ultimately a battle for the welfare of each one of us.
This paper will be presenting a new view regarding Chief Justice Renato Corona’s Impeachment Trial. It will tackle the Articles of Impeachment, limited to Articles 2, 3 and 7, and the other grounds included in the complaint, which are the subject matter of the Senate Impeachment Court. This paper will critique the Articles of impeachment involved, how they were presented and how they affect the nation as a whole.
Article II
RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND/OR BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST WHEN HE FAILED TO DISCLOSE TO THE PUBLIC HIS STATEMENT OF ASSETS, LIABILITIES, AND NET WORTH AS REQUIRED UNDER SEC. 17, ART. XI OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
2.1. It is provided for in Art. XI, Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution that a public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.
2.2. Respondent failed to disclose to the public his statement of assets, liabilities, and net worth as required by the Constitution.
2.3. It is also reported that some of the properties of Respondent are not included in his declaration of his assets, liabilities, and net worth, in violation of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act.
2.4. Respondent is likewise suspected and accused of having accumulated ill-gotten wealth, acquiring assets of high values and keeping bank accounts with huge deposits. It has been reported that Respondent has, among others, a 300-sq. meter apartment in a posh Mega World Property development at the Fort in Taguig. Has he reported this, as he is constitutionally-required under Art. XI, Sec. 17 of the Constitution in his Statement of Assets and Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN)? Is this acquisition sustained and duly supported by his income as a public official? Since his assumption as Associate and subsequently, Chief Justice, has he complied with this duty of public disclosure? Below are the laws relative to declaration of Statement of Assets, Liabilities and Net Worth (SALN) to support the main controversy:
Section 7 of Republic Act 3019, which was approved on August 17, 1960, known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, states that every public officer, within thirty days after the approval of this Act or after assuming office, and within the month of January of every other year thereafter, as well as upon the expiration of his term of office, or upon his resignation or separation from office, shall prepare and file with the office of the corresponding Department Head, or in the case of a Head of Department or chief of an independent office, with the Office of the President, or in the case of members of the Congress and the officials and employees thereof, with the Office of the Secretary of the corresponding House, a true detailed and sworn statement of assets and liabilities, including a statement of the amounts and sources of his income, the amounts of his personal and family expenses and the amount of income taxes paid for the next preceding calendar year: Provided, That public officers assuming office less than two months before the end of the calendar year, may file their statements in the following months of January.
To make more forceful of the implementation of the law mentioned, the constitutional commission embodied in Section 17 of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution the declaration of SALN, stating that a public officer or employee shall, upon assumption of office and as often thereafter as may be required by law, submit a declaration under oath of his assets, liabilities, and net worth. In the case of the President, the Vice-President, the Members of the Cabinet, the Congress, the Supreme Court, the Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional offices, and officers of the armed forces with general or flag rank, the declaration shall be disclosed to the public in the manner provided by law.
And to expand the two laws, Republic Act 6713 was enacted on February 20, 1989, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees. Section 8 thereof expressly states that public officials and employees have an obligation to accomplish and submit declarations under oath of, and the public has the right to know, their assets, liabilities, net worth and financial and business interests including those of their spouses and of unmarried children under eighteen (18) years of age living in their households.
The defense held the following positions in response to Article 2:
1. Corona complied with RA 6713 and inaccuracies can be remedied.
2. Exempted from public scrutiny. 3. Ill-gotten wealth is baseless.
The Senator Judges, on the other hand, commented also on the presentation of the article before the Senate Impeachment Court:
1. Article 2 of the impeachment complaint had been expanded by the prosecution from its original allegation
2. Issue number 2.2 and 2.3 are not high crimes,
Analysis:
With the foregoing laws, it is crystal clear that it exempts no one from submitting a SALN. Also, the former law makers materialized the requirement of SALN thrice into different laws, which means that the principal aim of enlarging the declaration of SALN of public officials and employees, from a statutory law (RA 3019) to the Fundamental Law (1987 Constitution) and expanded in RA 6713, is to deter unlawful accumulation of wealth.
The question now is why the prosecution quoted its allegation from the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, particularly section 17, instead of proving it with RA 3019, and after presenting all the evidence simply boiled down to proving that Chief Justice Corona amassed ill-gotten wealth. The 1987 Constitution is the fundamental law of the country which neither requires proof beyond reasonable doubt nor preponderance of evidence as substantiated in the deliberations of the constitutional commission in proving a violation of its provisions. Realize that the objective of requiring the disclosure of SALN is to curb the rampant violation of RA 3019. Therefore, the prosecution need not allege such illegal accumulation of wealth because it is necessarily implied (principle of necessary implication) in proving a violation of Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution.
The prosecution asserts that respondent failed to disclose to the public his SALN as required under Section 17 of the 1987 Constitution but Presiding Officer Enrile held that such failure is not constitutive of a high crime to render it as a culpable violation of the Constitution; hence, it can be remedied by correction, as corroborated by the defense team. As explained above, the purpose of Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution is to strengthen the provisions of RA 3019 – the Anti-Graft Law. The latter law provides for a prima facie evidence for dismissal or removal of a public officer as declared in section 8:
If in accordance with the provisions of Republic Act 1379, a public official has been found to have acquired during his incumbency, whether in his name or in the name of other persons, an amount of property and/or money manifestly out of proportion to his salary and to his other lawful income, that fact shall be a ground for dismissal or removal. Properties in the name of the spouse and unmarried children of such public official may be taken into consideration, when their acquisition through legitimate means cannot be satisfactorily shown. Bank deposits shall be taken into consideration in the enforcement of this section, notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary.
RA 1379, section 2 provides that whenever any public officer or employee has acquired during his incumbency an amount of property which is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property, said property shall be presumed prima facie to have been unlawfully acquired.
Ergo, a person’s acquisition of property and money manifestly out of proportion to his salary shall be presumed prima facie evidence as having been unlawfully acquired. Moreover, being the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, well-versed of the Constitution and other statutes, is inexcusable to deny his acts and omissions, especially the non-disclosure of his numerous properties subsequently acquired in detailed manner as mandated in RA 3019, which amounts to gross negligence similar to “culpable violation” of the Constitution. This then answers the second controversy (2.3). Below is Corona’s SALNs from 2002 to 2010:
In the absence of the prima facie clause, the failure of submitting a SALN and disclosing subsequent properties is still considered as violation of RA 3019 and RA 1376 for they are special laws. And special laws punish crimes which are mala prohibita, where good faith and criminal intent are not defenses to absolve an offender. Consequently, the intentional acts and omissions of CJ Corona, gross negligence, is an impeachable offense which warrant the conviction of culpable violation of Section 17, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution.
The defense team argued that CJ Corona is exempted from public scrutiny; nevertheless, he allowed the release of his SALN under the custody of the Clerk of Court. The 1992 SC Resolution from which the defense predicated their claim that CJ Corona has no legal duty to disclose his SALN is untenable to disprove the violation of Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution. The indispensable issue in this case is the genuineness and authenticity of the SALN as enforced in RA 6713 and RA 3019 to implement the objective of Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution. In the case of Oca v. Usman, the penalty for failure to disclose assets is more penalized than the failure to file the SALN for it constitutes dishonesty as infraction to the constitutional right of information on matter of public concern. Thus, a grave offense such as dishonesty may bring disrepute to the uprightness and integrity of an office.
Since it has been proven by the prosecution that there was a discrepancy in CJ Coronas’s SALN and the evidence presented and conformed with by the witnesses defeats the defense raised by respondent that Corona faithfully submitted his SALN and exempted from disclosure of SALN, Corona could be held liable for such discrepancy is flagrant violation against the main essence of Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution – to prevent betrayal of public trust.
To prove such allegation, presentation of the ITRs and tax certificates of the Corona children were requested. However, such presentation should not have been allowed for being without basis, irrelevant, and immaterial to the proceedings. The testimony of Commissioner Henares on the ITRs and tax certificates of the Corona children, as well as the presentation thereof, were therefore all irrelevant and immaterial to the issue of whether or not CJ Corona failed to disclose his SALN to the public.
The prosecution’s failure to include the new allegations in Article 2 showed the complainants’ lack of personal knowledge at the time they filed the verified complaint of the ultimate facts concerning suggestions of graft and corruption and accumulation of ill-gotten wealth. Complainants did not base their charges on their personal knowledge, much less on authentic documents, at the time they filed the verified complaint. To allow complainants to present evidence on matters not covered by the clear language of Article 2 will violate Corona’s constitutional right to due process and to be properly informed of the charges against him.
Above all, no matter how crystal clear the acts or omissions of CJ Corona were, if the manner of proving his guilt is contrary to his right to due process and other procedural laws, the impeachment complaint shall be doomed to fail. When the impeachment trial commenced, the prosecution presented several documents with unknown sources which immediately imputed CJ Corona for amassing illegal wealth. The presentation of such unverified documents render the prosecution’s points even weaker. It only showed how unprepared they were to face the Impeachment Court. No matter how heavy their case is, the same might not prosper on the ground of inadmissibility of the documents as evidence for they were not in accordance with the Rules on Evidence established by the Rules of Court. Unfortunately to CJ Corona’s extreme prejudice, these proceedings have become an illegal ‘fishing expedition.
In sum, the bedrock of whether or not CJ Corona is guilty of culpable violation of Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution is the essence of the creation of such provision which is to end the widespread unjust enrichment by means, methods or schemes enumerated in the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. We believe with the supporting legal arguments presented that the two issues are high crimes to justify culpable violation of Section 17, Article XI of the Constitution, the main issue. With respect to proving the guilt of respondent, that rests with the prosecution. As to adjudging Corona guilty for the violations in the complaint against him, that rests in the hands of the Senator Judges.
Article III
III. RESPONDENT COMMITTED CULPABLE VIOLATIONS OF THE CONSTITUTION AND BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST BY FAILING TO MEET AND OBSERVE THE STRINGENT STANDARDS UNDER ART. VIII, SECTION 7 (3) OF THE CONSTITUTION THAT PROVIDES THAT “[A] MEMBER OF THE JUDICIARY MUST BE A PERSON OF PROVEN COMPETENCE, INTEGRITY, PROBITY, AND INDEPENDENCE” IN ALLOWING THE SUPREME COURT TO ACT ON MERE LETTERS FILED BY A COUNSEL WHICH CAUSED THE ISSUANCE OF FLIP-FLOPPING DECISIONS IN FINAL AND EXECUTORY CASES; IN CREATING AN EXCESSIVE ENTANGLEMENT WITH MRS. ARROYO THROUGH HER APPOINTMENT OF HIS WIFE TO OFFICE; AND IN DISCUSSING WITH LITIGANTS REGARDING CASES PENDING BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT.
3.1. Respondent was appointed to the Supreme Court on April 9, 2002 by Mrs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo. Prior to his appointment, he served Arroyo for many years as her chief of staff, and spokesman when she was Vice-President, and later as her Presidential Chief-of-Staff, Presidential Spokesman, and Acting Executive Secretary.
3.2. Art. VIII, Section 7 (3) of the 1987 Constitution provides that “[a] Member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence.” Members of the Judiciary are expected to have these four qualities mandated by the Constitution because these form the very foundation for maintaining people’s faith in the Judiciary. Thus, it has been ruled by no less than the Supreme Court that:
“People who run the judiciary, particularly justices and judges, must not only be proficient in both the substantive and procedural aspects of the law, but more importantly, they must possess the highest degree of integrity and probity and an unquestionable moral uprightness both in their public and private lives.”
Although every office in the government service is a public trust, no position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and uprightness than a seat in the Judiciary. High ethical principles and a sense of propriety should be maintained, without which the faith of the people in the Judiciary so indispensable in an orderly society cannot be preserved.
3.3. Just very recently, the flip-flopping of the Corona Court on Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) v. Philippine Airlines, Inc., et al. – the recall of a September 7, 2011 Decision of the Supreme Court’s Second Division denying a Second Motion for Reconsideration of the 2008 ruling in favor of FASAP, on a mere letter from Philippine Airlines’ counsel Atty. Estelito Mendoza (who is the reported lead counsel of Respondent’s patroness; see Annexes “F” to “F-3”, infra), and without requiring a comment from or notice to the other parties to hear their side, betray Respondent’s lack of ethical principles and his disdain for fairness which has eroded the faith of the people in the Judiciary – for Respondent himself caused and allowed the violation of the adverse party’s constitutional right to due process.
3.3.1. The matter is made worse since the recall is reported to have been at the instance of Respondent Corona, who admitted that in 2008, he inhibited from the case. How then can he justify his interference in this case today? Why take part or interfere now?
3.3.2. What is even more disturbing is that under Respondent Corona’s watch as Chief Justice, the Supreme Court appears to be acting on mere letters kept hidden from those concerned and the other parties – and all from the same lawyer – Estelito Mendoza.
3.3.3 It must be recalled that the same Estelito Mendoza wrote a personal letter to Respondent which also caused the flip-flopping in the League of Cities v. COMELEC case. It must also be recalled that Estelito Mendoza is also the same person who filed Administrative Matter No. 10-2-5-SC, and was among the petitioners in the Supreme Court who posited that Mrs. Arroyo may appoint the next Chief Justice despite the constitutional ban; and through which petition, made it possible for the Supreme Court to legitimize and provide not only a strained but obviously erroneous basis for the midnight and constitutionally-prohibited appointment of Respondent.
3.3.4. In this connection, Respondent’s voting pattern even prior to his dubious appointment as Chief Justice, clearly proves a bias and manifest partiality for Mrs. Arroyo. It must be noted that under the law, bias need not be proven to actually exist; it is enough that the Chief Justice’s actions lend themselves to a reasonable suspicion that he does not possess the required probity and impartiality. In Rosauro v. Villanueva, the Supreme Court held that: “A judge should not only render a just, correct and impartial decision but should do so in such a manner as to be free from any suspicion as to its fairness and impartiality and as to his integrity. While a judge should possess proficiency in law in order that he can competently construe and enforce the law, it is more important that he should act and behave in such a manner that the parties before him should have confidence in his impartiality. Thus, it is not enough that he decides cases without bias and favoritism. Nor is it sufficient that he in fact rids himself of prepossessions. His actuations should moreover inspire that belief. Like Caesar’s wife, a judge must not only be pure but beyond suspicion.” [Underscoring supplied]
3.3.5. The bar is higher for judges, and by inference, highest for Justices and most especially the Chief Justice, because “the character of a judge is perceived by the people not only through his official acts but also through his private morals, as reflected in his external behavior.” Thus, “a judge should, in a pending or prospective litigation before him, be scrupulously careful to avoid such action as may reasonably tend to waken the suspicion that his social or business relations or friendships constitute an element in determining his judicial course.” [Underscoring and emphases supplied]
3.3.6. If a decision that is legally correct or justifiable can suffer from a suspicion of impartiality, more so will a decision that is entirely unsupported by legal reasoning. Thus, it has been held that a judge who “is ignorant of fairly elementary and quite familiar legal principles and administrative regulations, has a marked penchant for applying unorthodox, even strange theories and concepts in the adjudication of controversies, exhibits indifference to, and even disdain for due process and the rule of law, applies the law whimsically, capriciously, and oppressively, and displays bias and partiality”, is unfit to be a judge.
3.4. Respondent further compromised his independence when his wife, Cristina Corona, accepted an appointment on March 23, 2007 from Mrs. Gloria Arroyo to the Board of the John Hay Management Corporation (JHMC). The JHMC is a wholly-owned subsidiary corporation of the Bases Conversion Development Authority (BCDA), a government-owned-and-controlled corporation created under Republic Act No. 7227.
3.4.1. Shortly after assuming her well-paying job at JHMC, serious complaints were filed against Mrs. Corona by her fellow Board members, as well as from the Management and rank-and-file employees of the JHMC. Mrs. Corona’s election as Director and President was reportedly withdrawn in a resolution passed by the Board of Directors of JHMC because of acts of misconduct and negligence. Copies of the JHMC Board Resolution withdrawing Mrs. Corona’s election as JHMC President and Chairman, the Position Paper prepared by the JHMC Management, and the resignation letter of retired Court of Appeals Justice Teodoro Regino from the JHMC Board of Directors, all of which chronicle the serious irregularities committed by Mrs. Corona, are attached hereto as Annexes “G”, “H” and “I”, respectively.
3.4.2. Instead of acting upon the serious complaints against Mrs. Corona, Mrs. Arroyo instructed all members of the JHMC to tender their courtesy resignations immediately. After the resignations, Mrs. Corona was retained and even promoted after President Arroyo expressed her desire for Mrs. Corona’s election as OIC Chairman of the JHMC Board.
3.4.3. Despite the numerous other complaints against Mrs. Corona, including one from Baguio Mayor Reinaldo Bautista where he protested Mrs. Corona’s move to replace the members of the JHMC Management Team, in violation of the terms of City Council Resolution No. 362 which protects the security of tenure in the JHMC of local residents occupying key positions in the corporation (a copy of his letter dated July 25, 2007 is attached as Annex “J”), and despite adverse findings in the COA report that also established that she was improperly holding office in St. Ignatius Village in Quezon City, Mrs. Corona was not removed from her position. She was even allowed to rack up unnecessary expenses totalling Six Hundred Ninety Thousand And One Hundred Eighty-Three Pesos (P690,183.00) which she spent holding office in Quezon City when JHMC’s operations were all in Baguio City. A copy of the COA report is attached as Annex “K”.
3.4.4. Mrs. Corona’s job was ensured with specific instructions of Mrs. Arroyo expressed through several desire letters issued to the BCDA specifically to ensure the election of Mrs. Corona to several positions in the JHMC, copies of which are attached as Annexes “L”, “L-1” and “L-2”. This also explains why despite the serious complaints against Mrs. Corona, Mrs. Arroyo never removed her from JHMC but instead kept on promoting and protecting her.
3.4.5. Mrs. Corona’s appointment is a violation of the Code of Judicial Conduct that provides: “Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.” [Sec. 4, Canon 1; emphasis and underscoring supplied]
“Judges shall not use or lend the prestige of the judicial office to advance their private interests, or those of a member of their family or of anyone else, nor shall they convey or permit others to convey the impression that anyone is in a special position improperly to influence them in the performance of judicial duties.” [Sec. 8, Canon 4; emphasis and underscoring supplied]
3.4.6. The New Code of Judicial Conduct further provides that it is unethical for a magistrate and members of his family to ask for or receive any gift in exchange for any act done or to be done by the judge in the course of his judicial functions:
“Judges and members of their families shall neither ask for, nor accept, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with the performance of judicial duties.” [Sec. 8, Canon 4; emphasis and underscoring supplied] “Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.” [Sec. 5, Canon 1; emphasis and underscoring supplied]
3.4.7. Clearly, a grossly improper (although personally and mutually beneficial) relationship between the Respondent and Mrs. Arroyo was created when Mrs. Corona was appointed to the JHMC. The JHMC is a GOCC under the Executive Department headed by Mrs. Arroyo. The appointment of Mrs. Corona in JHMC as its highest management officer is clearly intended to secure the loyalty and vote of Respondent in the Supreme Court. In a similar case, the Supreme Court found it unethical for the judge to allow his daughters to accept the business offer of persons who have a pending case before the judge’s court:
“The New Code of Judicial Conduct for the Philippine Judiciary prescribes that judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer. Thus, judges are to avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all their activities. Likewise, they are mandated not to allow family, social or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge. The Code clearly prohibits judges or members of their families from asking for or accepting, any gift, bequest, loan or favor in relation to anything done or to be done or omitted to be done by him or her in connection with the performance of judicial duties. Respondent judge failed to live up to these standards. Despite knowledge of Onofre and Mariano’s intentions in offering the business to his daughters, respondent judge allowed his daughters to accept the offer of business partnership with persons who have pending cases in his court.”
3.4.8. Respondent should be held to even higher standards because he is the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court. Since joining JHMC, Mrs. Corona received a substantial salary, aside from other perks of the job, including cars and various travel opportunities. In exchange, as discussed above, the voting record of Respondent in the Supreme Court indicate an unmistakable pattern of favoring Arroyo in cases brought before the Supreme Court challenging her policies and actions. All these foregoing facts betray the Respondent’s lack of qualification as Chief Justice as he has demonstrated a lack of competence, integrity, probity, or independence.
3.4.9. Respondent reportedly dipped his hands into public funds to finance personal expenses. Numerous personal expenses that have nothing to do with the discharge of his official functions, such as lavish lunches and dinners, personal travels and vacations, and fetes and parties, have reportedly been charged by the Respondent to judicial funds. In essence, Respondent has been reportedly using the judicial fund as his own personal expense account, charging to the Judiciary personal expenditures.
3.4.10. It is therefore apparent that there is reasonable ground to hold Respondent for the reported misuse of public funds, and in acts that would qualify as violations of the anti-graft and corrupt practices act, including malversation of public funds, and use of public funds for private purposes.
3.5. In addition, Respondent Corona failed to maintain high standards of judicial conduct in connection with the Vizconde massacre case, in the process, casted doubt upon the integrity of the Supreme Court itself.
3.5.1. All judges must “exhibit and promote high standards of judicial conduct in order to reinforce public confidence in the judiciary, which is fundamental to the maintenance of judicial independence.” To do so, it is required “that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.” Included in this prescription of what constitutes acceptable and non-acceptable conduct is that rule that judges “shall not knowingly, while a proceeding is before or could come before them, make any comment that might reasonably be expected to affect the outcome of such proceeding or impair the manifest fairness of the process. Nor shall judges make any comment in public or otherwise that might affect the fair trial of any person or issue.” Likewise, “(j)udges shall not, in the performance of judicial duties, by words or conduct, manifest bias or prejudice towards any person or group on irrelevant grounds.”
3.5.2. Despite these strictures, Respondent has directly, deliberately, and shamelessly attempted to destroy the credibility and standing of the Supreme Court with respect to one important and publicly-celebrated case that was before it on automatic appeal: the celebrated Vizconde Massacre case.
3.5.3. Sometime in early September 2010, Lauro Vizconde, surviving member of the Vizconde family who were murdered in 1991, and Dante Jimenez of the Volunteers Against Crime and Corruption (VACC) paid a courtesy call upon the Respondent in his chambers after his appointment as Chief Justice.
3.5.4. During the courtesy call, Vizconde asked the Respondent about the status of the multiple murder case against Hubert Webb and the other accused, which was at the time pending appeal before the Supreme Court. Despite the obvious impropriety, Respondent, instead of rebuffing Vizconde for asking the questions, engaged Vizconde in a personal and ex-parte conversation regarding a case then pending consideration before the Supreme Court.
3.5.5. Worse, in the course of the conversation, Respondent told Vizconde, in the presence of Jimenez, that fellow Justice Antonio Carpio was allegedly lobbying for the acquittal of Hubert Webb. According to Vizconde in a sworn Affidavit dated January 27, 2011, Respondent said that “Talagang brina-braso at ini-impluwensiyahan ni Carpio ang kanyang mga kasama para mapawalang-sala si Webb [Carpio was really arm-twisting and influencing his colleagues to acquit Webb],” or words to that effect. Jimenez corroborated Vizconde’s statement in his own sworn Affidavit dated January 26, 2011.
3.5.6. The fact that Respondent spoke with Vizconde regarding a case pending before the Supreme Court is in itself already a serious breach of the rule of confidentiality that must be maintained by the Court with respect to cases pending before it, as well as the deliberations of the members of the Court. Such confidentiality is absolutely necessary in order to ensure that members of the Court are insulated from lobbying and pressure coming from any of the litigants of a pending case. Respondent’s action, as Chief Justice, is in itself unbecoming and unworthy of a Chief Justice.
3.5.7. Indeed, in Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, the Supreme Court sanctioned a justice of the Court of Appeals for a similar act of discussing a pending case with interested parties for having “failed to maintain the high standard of independence and propriety that is required of him.” The Supreme Court further held: “Taking his conversation with his brother and his encounters with Mr. de Borja together, Justice Sabio gives the impression that he is accessible to lobbyists who would unfairly try to manipulate court proceedings. Even assuming arguendo that Justice Sabio was not moved by his brother’s request and that he rejected Mr. de Borja’s bribe offer, the Court feels compelled to call Justice Sabio’s attention to his own shortcomings under the circumstances. At the very least, Justice Sabio should have realized that his discussions of court matters, especially those that have not yet been made of public record, with persons who are interested in the case were incredibly indiscreet and tended to undermine the integrity of judicial processes. We see no reason to reverse the Panel’s finding that Justice Sabio’s conversations with his brother and Mr. de Borja were ‘indiscreet and imprudent’.”
3.5.8. Significantly, Respondent signed and concurred with the above-mentioned Resolution of the Supreme Court. Yet, Respondent Corona committed the same pernicious act of discussing a pending case with interested parties.
3.5.9. Worse, however, is the fact that Respondent intrigued against the honor and integrity of a fellow Justice in his absence, in the process, maligning and undermining the credibility of the Supreme Court as an institution. By painting for Vizconde a picture of a Court that is subject to the influence of one out of 15 Justices, and making it appear that the eventual decision of the Court in the case would be attributable to internal arm-twisting and influence, Respondent destroyed the credibility of the very institution that he was supposed to be leading.
3.5.10. In trying to pin the blame of a possible acquittal upon a fellow Justice, Respondent was himself sowing the seeds of discontent and distrust of the Supreme Court with a party litigant. As it happened, Vizconde and Jimenez did raise the supposed internal arm-twisting and influence before the media while the case was in the final stages of decision. By provoking Vizconde to pre-empt the decision with negative publicity, Respondent himself is guilty of directly undermining the trust and confidence of the public in the Supreme Court regardless of what its decision would have later turned out to be.
3.5.11. Worse still, is that the act of the Respondent violates Sec. 3(k) of Rep. Act 3019, or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, which prohibits any official from “(d)ivulging valuable information of a confidential character, acquired by his office or by him on account of his official position to unauthorized persons, or releasing such information in advance of its authorized release date.” It is clear from the context of the conversation with Vizconde and Jimenez, that Respondent was signalling the latter to prepare for an acquittal, and giving them someone to blame therefor. Given the high profile of the case, it is not unreasonable to assume that at the time of the conservation, the Supreme Court had already begun deliberations on the case, and that Respondent already had a sense of what the decision of the Court would probably be.
3.6. Respondent Corona with undue haste, impropriety and irregularity, dismissed the inter-petal recreational corporation case under suspicious circumstances.
3.6.1. Respondent was accused by Fernando Campos of unethical conduct when he met ex parte with the lawyer of the adverse party in connection with a pending case before him. In an attempt to defend himself against the complaint for unethical conduct filed against him by Campos, Respondent explicitly admitted violating the New Code of Judicial Conduct. In his letter dated February 8, 2010 to the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), Respondent refuted the claim of Campos that he allegedly met with a lawyer of Philweb Corporation in connection with a case pending before him but countered that:
“On the contrary, it was Campos himself who actively tried to pressure me into deciding G.R. No. 186711 in his favor. I was pestered by calls from different people on his behalf. By his own admission in his ‘executive summary,’ he asked Justice Angelina Gutierrez, Santiago Kapunan and Leonardo Quisumbing, among others to intercede for him.” (Emphasis supplied)
3.6.2 In his very own words, Respondent admitted that various persons were able to communicate with him in connection with a case that was pending before him precisely in an attempt to influence him in his resolution of the said case. In allowing himself to be approached by persons which he knew were trying to exercise their influence over him on a particular case pending before him and in failing to take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against such actions, Respondent violated basic precepts of the New Code of Judicial Conduct, which provides, among others, that:
“Canon 1 – Independence
Sec. 1. Judges shall exercise the judicial function independently on the basis of their assessment of the facts and in accordance with a conscientious understanding of the law, free from extraneous influence, inducement, pressure, threat or interference, direct or indirect, from any quarter or for any reason.
x x x
Sec. 4. Judges shall not allow family, social, or other relationships to influence judicial conduct or judgment. The prestige of judicial office shall not be used or lent to advance the private interests of others, nor convey or permit others to convey the impression that they are in a special position to influence the judge.
Sec. 5. Judges shall not only be free from inappropriate connections with, and influence by, the executive and legislative branches of government, but must also appear to be free therefrom to a reasonable observer.”
“Canon 2 – Integrity
Sec. 1. Judges shall ensure that not only is their conduct above reproach, but that it is perceived to be so in the view of a reasonable observer.
Sec. 2. The behavior and conduct of judges must reaffirm the people’s faith in the integrity of the judiciary. Justice must not merely be done but must also be seen to be done.
Sec. 3. Judges should take or initiate appropriate disciplinary measures against lawyers or court personnel for unprofessional conduct of which the judge may have become aware.”
“Canon 3 – Impartiality
x x x
Sec. 2. Judges shall ensure that his or her conduct, both in and out of court, maintains and enhances the confidence of the public, the legal profession and litigants in the impartiality of the judge and of the judiciary.”
“Canon 4 – Propriety
Propriety and the appearance of propriety are essential to the performance of all the activities of a judge.
Sec. 1. Judges shall avoid impropriety and the appearance of impropriety in all of their activities.”
3.6.3. To restate in In Re: Letter of Presiding Justice Conrado M. Vasquez, the Supreme Court held that such conduct amounted to a failure to maintain the high standard of independence and propriety that is required of a judge.
3.6.4. For emphasis, Respondent signed and concurred with the above-mentioned Resolution of the Supreme Court. Surely, Respondent, as Chief Justice, cannot be exempt from the same rule and principle. As Chief Justice, he must in fact be held to a higher standard. The Supreme Court further said of justices:
“While it may be true that from a psychological stand point ordinary persons can have a wide variety of valid reactions to any given situation, Justice Sabio should bear in mind his high office as a magistrate of the appellate court sets him apart from ordinary persons. Being the subject of constant public scrutiny, members of the bench should freely and willingly accept behavioral restrictions that may be viewed by ordinary citizens as burdensome.” (emphasis supplied)
3.6.5. Moreover, Respondent not only should have scrupulously guarded his reputation as a Supreme Court Justice, it behooved upon him to have done a positive act to ensure that Campos and the latter’s emissaries be dealt with administratively for the brazen attempt to influence a magistrate of the Supreme Court. This he utterly failed to do.
After three laboring weeks on Article 2, the prosecution started to tackle the third article in the verified impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Renato C. Corona. Article 3 focused on the alleged lack of competence, integrity, probity and independence of the Chief Justice. Article 3 of the impeachment complaint states that Chief Justice Ranato Corona (respondent) Committed Culpable Violations of the Constitution and Betrayed the Public Trust by failing to commit and observe the stringent standards under Art. VIII, section 7 (3) of the Constitution provides that “[A] member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven Competence, Integrity, Probity, and Independence” in allowing the Supreme Court to act on mere Letters filed by the counsel which caused the issuance of flip-flopping decisions in final and executor cases; in creating an excessive entanglement with Mrs. Arroyo through her appointment of his wife to office; and in discussing with litigant’s regarding to case pending before the Supreme Court.
Article 3 focuses on four main allegations: 1) The Chief Justice allowing the Supreme Court to act on mere letters that led to the “flip-flopping” of decisions before the Supreme Court; 2) Corona’s “excessive entanglement” with former President Arroyo manifested through the appointment of his wife; 3) The Chief Justice dipped his hands in public funds; and 4) talking with litigants specifically Lauro Vizconde. The prosecution, in order to speedily get through their presentations and believing that they already have a strong case against the Chief Justice, decided to withdraw allegations 2, 3, and 4, and decided to focus on the first allegation – that is, the “flip-flopping” decisions by the Supreme Court on certain cases which Corona allegedly influenced.
The case involved FASAP v. PAL wherein the Supreme Court recalled its “final” decision ordering Philippine Airlines (PAL) to reinstate 1, 400 members of the Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP) due to a ruling made by the wrong division in the Supreme Court . The Court’s resolution came as a confusing mark to the people after PAL’s counsel, Atty. Estelito Mendoza, wrote the Supreme Court and questioned the ruling of the Second Division. It was supposedly the Third Division that should have ruled on the case. The case was an offshoot of the PAL announcement back in 1998 that it was laying off thousand of its employees to avoid bankruptcy.
The prosecution tried to nail Chief Justice Corona by alleging that reversing the ruling in favor of PAL without even asking the other parties to comment in order to aid their side showed the respondent’s “lack of ethical principles and his disdain for the fairness which has eroded the faith of the people in the Judiciary .” It was also purported by the prosecution that the recall of the ruling was on the instance of the Chief Justice, acting on mere letters emanating from PAL’s lawyer – Estelito Mendoza.
During the trial, the first and only witness for Article 3, the President of The Flight Attendants’ and Stewards’ Association of the Philippines (PASAF) Roberto Anduiza, was presented. Roberto stated that they won 3 cases against Philippine Air Lines (PAL) reinstating the employees and flight attendants to their previous position, and ordering the payment of damages or back wages. But in October 4, 2011, the decision was reversed because of the letter of one of the lawyer of PAL. Roberto also wondered because the Chief Justice did not participate in the previous decisions of the case; however, on reversed decision of the Supreme Court last October 4, 2011, the Chief Justice cooperated in the decision in favor of PAL. Also in Article 3, the prosecution filed a request to subpoena some justices of the Supreme Court, although the said request will be decided by a caucus session, a closed group meeting to decide or resolve a certain issue, process, and action of the court. The hesitant presiding officer Enrile simply stated that the separation of power between the co-equal branches of the government, specifically the Legislative and Judiciary, will be violated by summoning the justices. Presiding officer Enrile also stated that the justices will have the prerogative to appear before the Senate Impeachment Court or not, because giving them leeway and discretion will be the only way so as not to impair the system of checks and balance in the government. The prosecution said that the issue is accountability and not separation of powers, so that the honorable court has a power to issue a subpoena to summon in this court. Still, the court remained steadfast in its impartiality to allow the justices the practice of discretion in coming to the impeachment court or not.
The defense countered the allegations in their reply by stating that first, lawyers and litigants often write to the Chief Justice regarding their cases. It was not an unusual act by PAL’s lawyer to have written such a letter to the respondent. After all, every letter that comes in is treated as official communication to the Court. Thereafter they are endorsed to the Supreme Court en banc, thus no letter is kept a secret in the Supreme Court. Secondly, the Chief Justice indeed inhibited from the case back in 2008. Therefore, there was no way for him to influence the outcome of the decision of the case. Thirdly, the letter from Atty. Mendoza merely pointed out the error in raffling the case to the Second Division when it was supposed to be decided by the Third Division. The case was remanded to the Supreme Court en banc to end the confusion and settle the controversy. Even then, the Chief Justice did not take part in the case . The defense purported that it would be unfair to impute upon the Chief Justice every inch of blame because the Supreme Court is a collegial body and its actions depend upon the consensus among its members.
Analysis:
Among all the articles presented by the prosecution, we believe that Article 3 stands the weakest. The prosecution implicated the Chief Justice for committing and violating the constitutional provision that a member of the Judiciary must be a person of proven competence, integrity, probity, and independence in their allegation that the respondent influenced and directed the “flip-flopping” decision of the Supreme Court in the case of FASAP vs. PAL . In the FASAP vs. PAL, During the trial, Roberto Anduiza testified that the Chief Justice distorted the previous decision of the Supreme Court with regard to reinstating flight attendants and other employees to their positions after receiving Atty. Estelito Mendoza’s letter.
The prosecution gave weak evidence to a strong allegation. Nowhere in the course of justice will we be able to find a weak link succeeding in putting up a gigantic fight. The testimony of Anduiza did not confirm anything as to the allegation of influencing the “flip-flopping” decision, more so to the alleged incompetence of the Chief Justice. As the defense posits, it is unfair to blame Corona for the reversal of the ruling. The Supreme Court is a collegial body and its actions or decisions are dependent upon the consensus of the entire Supreme Court . The Chief Justice may be the highest among the justices in the Supreme Court; nevertheless, he is only entitled to the same right of one vote per case wherein the justices participate. We may not know it first hand, but the Chief Justice is not a dictator who can just impose upon the other Associate Justices where to place their vote. Our justices are men of great intelligence. Their decisions may not always be impeccable, but their knowledge of the law and experience in administering justice are enough to place us in a position of faith in their capabilities.
The withdrawal of the other sub-articles in Article 3 even weakened the position of the prosecution. It may have been for the best interest of the Senate Impeachment Court and the public, but the withdrawal favored the defense.
The request by the prosecution panel to subpoena the other Associate Justices who took part in the decision is indeed tantamount to encroachment upon the power of the Supreme Court. The Presiding Officer in reiterating his stance against creating a constitutional crisis was brave enough to point out what the prosecution lawyers failed to see at hindsight. The power to summon the justices is not expressly stated in the law, but one of the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court during the 2011 Bar Passer’s Oath Taking stated that neither the Impeachment Court nor the Supreme Court stands as the highest among all courts but the law.
Article VII
RESPONDENT BETRAYED THE PUBLIC TRUST THROUGH HIS PARTIALITY IN GRANTING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER (TRO) IN FAVOR OF FORMER PRESIDENT GLORIA MACAPAGAL – ARROYO AND HER HUSBAND JOSE MIGUEL ARROYO IN ORDER TO GIVE THEM AN OPPORTUNITY TO ESCAPE PROSECUTION AND TO FRUSTRATE THE ENDS OF JUSTICE, AND IN DISTORTING THE SUPREME COURT DECISION ON THE EFFECTIVITY OF OF THE TRO IN VIEW OF A CLEAR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE CONDITIONS ON THE SUPREME COURT’S OWN TRO.
The Supreme Court, under the respondent, immediately acted upon the Petition and granted the TRO despite that clear inconsistencies in former President Arroyo’s petition.
It appears from reports that the ponente to whom the petitions were raffled was an Associate Justice. Under the Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, a TRO can only be considered upon the recommendation of the ponente. In view of certain objections against the grant of the TRO, a holding of hearing within a short period of five (5) days is recommended. Despite this recommendation, the respondent engineered a majority of eight (8) votes (against five dissenters) immediate granting the issuance of the TRO in favor of former President Arroyo and her husband in blatant violation on their own internal rules.
Despite the conditions laid by the SC for the issuance of the TRO, respondent allowed it notwithstanding the fact that there was noncompliance of an essential pre-condition. Due to Arroyo’s abject failure to comply with the second condition, the Supreme Court en banc in its November 18, 2011 deliberation found that there was no compliance with said condition. Consequently, for failure to comply with the essential condition for the TRO, the TRO is rendered ineffective. However, majority of the Supreme Court decided that there was no need to explicitly state the legal effect of the noncompliance. It is notable that the respondent did not chastise Administrator Jose Midas Marquez for his outrightly false and public misrepresentations. Worse, the respondent did not correct the decision that was issued despite the fact that the decision did not reflect the agreement made by the Supreme Court during their deliberations on November 18, 2011.
Conditions are made were: the payment of 2 million cash bond, the appointment of a legal representative for both Arroyo and her husband, and their personal appearance or call at the Philippine Embassy or consular office in the country they were to visit.
Chief Justice Corona and seven other magistrates, Associate Justices Presbitero Velasco Jr, Arturo Brion, Diosdado Peralta, Lucas Bersamin, Roberto Abad, Martin Villarama, Jr. and Jose Perez, who voted to issue the TRO, were all appointed by Arroyo during her nine-year presidency.
Accused of being Arroyo’s midnight appointee, Corona once served also as her Chief of Staff and spokesperson.
Of the five dissenters, three are among the appointees of President Aquino – Associate Justices Ma. Lourdes Sereno, Bienvenido Reyes and Estela Perlas- Bernabe. Senior Associate Justice Antonio Carpio and Associate Justice Jose Mendoza are the other dissenters. The five justices who voted against the Arroyo petition wanted the high court to conduct a hearing of the case before issuing a decision.
On November 15, 2011, videos of the Arroyo couple attempting to leave town was shown all over national television. Private Prosecutor Al Parreno conducted a direct examination of ABS-CBN cameraman Danny Piedad but the presiding officer took over the questioning. Piedad is the cameraman of reporter Zen Hernandez.
Piedad testified that he shot the video of former Presidet Arroyo’s arrival at Ninoy International Airport on November 15, 2011. That video was afterwards shown on a projector screen at the Senate session hall. Parenno asked the defense panel to stipulate on the authenticity of the video but lead defense counsel Serafin Cuevas refused and asked to be given time before cross examining the cameraman.
Parreno conducted the direct examination of ABS- CBN video librarian Rochelle Inoncillo-Mendez, who authenticated the video recording of the attempt of the Arroyo couple to leave the country on November 15, 2011 amidst the circumstances surrounding the Supreme Court’s issuance of TRO on the watch list order against the Arroyo couple. Mendez also testified on the authenticity on the other 7 dvds her office produced to comply with the Senate’s subpoena duces tecum. She confirmed that she was also the custodian of the other video regarding the footage of Supreme Court spokesman Midas Marquez talking about the TRO on November 15, 16 and 21.
Mendez admitted that she could not testify on the events recorded because she was not there. But the presiding officer declared Mendez as a “competent witness” because she was the custodian of the dvds. He ruled that the best evidence is content of the dvds, adding that the events were already “common public knowledge” and that the senate can take judicial notice thereof.
Senator- judge Loren Legarda grilled Parreno on the prosecution’s purpose in showing the video footage of the bag containing the P2 Million cash bond. Parreno explained that the video showed the “attempt of payment” on November 15,2011 at 4:15 in the afternoon but payment was allowed only by 6:03pm after the court’s regular office hours.
In view of the issue to call on other Supreme Court personnel and justices who may testify, Senate Secretary Emma Lirio, as the impeachment trial clerk of court, read into the record the response of Supreme Court clerk of court Enriquetta Vidal reiterating the Court’s February 14 resolution disallowing Supreme Court justices and personnel from testifying in the impeachment trial. House prosecutor Colmenares branded the refusal as “sad and frightening.” That same day the prosecution team dropped the other five articles to make it convenient for the Senator- judges and to minimize the time on the trial.
Analysis:
The case of Marcos vs Manglapus is far different from the case of the Arroyo couple. The former case is about the Marcoses wishing to return to the country three years after the non-violent “people power” revolution. The right to travel, like any other right, has its own limitations. During their request to return, it was a time of trying the stability of the government whose economy was just barely moving forward. In Arroyo’s case, her alleged medical condition pushes them to seek medical assistance abroad, a right recognized by our law. However, as of the moment where there are charges filed against them, they cannot be allowed to travel.
The prosecution did the right thing in presenting the some expert opinions on what was the real situation of former President Arroyo’s health during the time that they received the TRO. The prosecution also questioned the countries where they plan to go, most of which do not have an extradition treaty with the Philippines. However, during the trial the prosecution lacked the skills in probing the witnesses to answering their questions, and sometimes even in forming their questions. This obviously made some doubt their competence to pursue the case.
Conclusion:
Chief Justice Renato Corona’s impeachment case has clearly divided the Filipino people. There are those on the side who have pre-judged him even if the trial has not yet ended; and on the other hand, there are those who have come to appreciate the fundamental law, the idea of the right to due process, and the principle of separation of powers of the three coequal branches of government. According to recent surveys, the trust rating of the Chief Justice has fallen drastically. This is an indicator that the idea of the impeachment trial is in active participation with the people’s minds. It is a healthy pointer that we, Filipinos, want to be involved in the issues about our country. It is also a mark that Filipinos have long been changed from the passive nation we used to be, to one that tries to be aware of the progress and changes around it.
Ultimately, the impeachment trial is not just about Corona. The chief justice is not only the one who is on trial but also we – The Filipino. The prosecution is on trial as they present their points to the Senator-judges. The defense team is on trial as they secure that their client’s rights are recognized and protected. The Senator-judges are on trial as they, too, are made subject of criticism by judgmental eyes among the public. And most importantly, the nation as a whole is on trial as the international scene watch us from afar. We are being tried as a nation for our values and how meaningful they have been instilled within us. We are a nation that holds on to the olden values taught to us by former generations. Our values of truth, integrity, nationalism are being held in question today. The modern-day Filipino must transcend beyond the result of the impeachment proceeding towards a future that still strives for democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality, and peace .
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